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THE ROYAL NAVY AND ORGANIZATIONAL 
LEARNING
The Western Approaches Tactical Unit and the Battle of the Atlantic
Geoffrey Sloan
Our Atlantic trade is suffering very severe losses from U-boat and air 
attacks in the Western Approaches. Our merchant shipping is causing 
grave and increasing anxiety. Anti-invasion trade protection require-
ments in the North Sea and narrow waters and our many commitments 
overseas at the present time do not allow us to increase the numbers of 
naval escorts allocated to Atlantic trade. Increased protection can only 
be given by operating our naval and air forces from bases in Eire nearer 
to the area of enemy attack. 
CHIEFS OF STAFF, MEMORANDUM, “NECESSITY FOR BASE FACILITIES IN EIRE,” MARCH 8, 1941
The highest type of naval officer is that wherein great professional 
knowledge is added to force of character. The danger within the Navy 
itself is lest insufficient importance should be attached to the results of 
study, and lest the value of what is called the practical character should 
be placed higher than it deserves. It is true that no student will ever 
become a victorious leader unless he is also a practical seaman and 
has the power of influencing men; but it is also true that no seaman, 
however practical, will be fit to rise beyond a certain rank unless he has 
thought out the problems of his calling as a student and has omitted no 
opportunity of acquiring the knowledge that makes up the science of his 
profession. 
MEMORANDUM DEALING WITH THE ENTRY, TRAINING, AND EMPLOYMENT OF OFFICERS AND 
MEN OF THE ROYAL NAVY AND OF THE ROYAL MARINES, 1902
 These epigraphs illustrate two things: first, the geostrategic challenge the Royal Navy faced between the fall of France in June 1940 and the D-day landings 
of June 1944; second, the importance of fusing professional education, leader-
ship skills, and the practical ability of the seaman�1 The factors in the latter point 
can be attributed to Admiral John A� “Jacky” Fisher, RN, the reforming First Sea 
Lord of the early twentieth century�2 Why was this synthesis important? Fisher 
believed it would increase the operational effectiveness of naval officers, and in 
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that early part of World War II, the Battle of the Atlantic might have been lost if 
naval officers did not become sufficiently effective�
This article will explore two related questions� First, can a theory of organi-
zational learning be applied to explain the improved effectiveness of one tactical 
organization during the Second World War? That improvement can be char-
acterized specifically as the development of an antisubmarine tactical doctrine 
between 1942 and 1945 and the acquisition of new knowledge in the operational 
context of the Battle of the Atlantic� Second, was a new organization, the Western 
Approaches Tactical Unit (WATU)—despite being a product of a bureaucratic, 
centrally controlled, hierarchical Admiralty—able to collect, transfer, and inte-
grate knowledge to achieve three objectives: challenge existing norms, objectives, 
and policies that pertained to trade defense; facilitate doctrinal innovation to 
counter the tactics of German U-boats used to attack convoys; and teach and 
disseminate doctrine to naval officers appointed to escorts in the North Atlantic 
and officers from the Coastal Command of the Royal Air Force (RAF)?
The article will render a judgment regarding the extent to which WATU’s 
activities enhanced the effectiveness of trade defense� Did it resolve what Max 
Visser has called “the ‘learning paradox’ and � � � combine conditions of hierarchy 
and discipline with adaptability and flexibility”?3 Finally, does this analysis rep-
resent a historically specific case, or are there lessons for other navies to learn in 
the twenty-first century?
In addressing these questions, it is important to acknowledge that a body of 
research into these topics exists already� How do military organizations fail, in-
novate, and learn? The literature covers all three categories�4 With respect to the 
first category, Eliot Cohen and John Gooch developed what they have called a 
“taxonomy of misfortune�” They claim that “there are three kinds of failure: a 
failure to learn, a failure to anticipate, and a failure to adapt� Each has its own 
characteristics and consequences�”5 In terms of the second category, Williamson 
Murray and Allan Millett have argued that there are three patterns of innovation: 
technology, organizational politics, and civil-military collaboration� How they 
combine to facilitate innovation is more complex; it is “a combination of astute 
political support and guidance usually exercised by a few politicians, attention of 
civilian and military technologists to the most promising innovations, and cre-
ation of staffs and organizations that can turn ideas into experimental exercises�”6
Fighting organizations can produce distinct attitudes to learning that can 
persist over long periods� Robert Foley and Sergio Catignani have examined the 
British army’s approach to learning in both the First World War and the recent 
campaign in Afghanistan�7 Aimée Fox-Godden has summarized their conclu-
sions in the following way: “Both highlight the army’s reliance on informal learn-
ing methods owing to an organizational culture that centres on pragmatism and 
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dislike of formal doctrine� Although they acknowledge the army’s utilization of 
formal learning systems, both argue that learning and knowledge sharing take 
place through predominantly informal, individualized methods�”8
These areas of research can be applied to the WATU case to help analyze the 
organizational learning that took place and its effectiveness� WATU has received 
scant treatment in the literature on the Battle of the Atlantic� Cohen and Gooch 
do not mention it by name, but they recognized it as being of coequal importance 
with operational intelligence� “The British anti-submarine effort, clearly the most 
successful of any of the participants in World War II, succeeded in large part be-
cause of their ability to master these two requirements of ASW [antisubmarine 
warfare]: efficient collection, collation, and communication of intelligence and 
development of appropriate doctrine�”9
THEORIES OF INSTITUTIONAL LEARNING
A theory of learning can be useful for understanding how the process takes 
place within an organization, but scholars and experts disagree regarding these 
theories� Some claim that knowledge capable of changing the performance of an 
organization can be formulated, captured, and translated into a set of codified in-
structions, which then can be disseminated within the organization�10 In contrast 
to this claim is the idea of knowledge as a “multifaceted, dynamic, provisional and 
socially situated activity where context and interpretative frames are essential�”11 
This second theory has much to recommend it, as it acknowledges that a chang-
ing social context can affect attempts to interpret and learn about a new, challeng-
ing situation�12 There is also a theory that lies between these two poles: the theory 
of absorptive capacity� This states that the “ability to evaluate and utilize outside 
knowledge is largely a function of the level of prior related knowledge[,] � � � 
[which] confers an ability to recognize the value of new information, assimilate 
it, and apply it�”13
Chris Argyris and Donald Schon call into question all three of these interpre-
tations of learning: as a set of codified instructions, a socially situated activity, or 
a theory of absorptive capacity� They object that each of these theories claims to 
understand and account for a complex reality, yet “no single perspective gives a 
workable basis either for diagnosing the impediments to organizational learning 
or for designing interventions which would increase the organizational capacity 
for learning�”14
Argyris and Schon developed two theories on how organizations learn� The 
first is called single-loop learning� The analogy is to a thermostat; it “learns when 
it is too hot or too cold and turns the heat on or off� The thermostat can perform 
this task because it can receive information (the temperature of the room) and 
take corrective action�” The second theory is called double-loop learning� This 
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occurs when an individual or organization receives information and takes action, 
but the outcome is not the desired result� Developing remedial action requires 
assessing the core features of the organization, which leads to errors being “de-
tected and corrected in ways that involve the modification of an organization’s 
underlying norms, policies, and objectives�”15
A crucial difference between these two types of learning is the ease with which 
organizations can perform them� Single-loop learning is an achievable task for 
most organizations; double-loop learning, by contrast, presents a complex chal-
lenge� With respect to the former, as long as the objectives and the context remain 
the same, the process of detection and correction will continue successfully� 
However, a context that changes or objectives that no longer are achievable can 
lead to questioning of the organization’s underpinning norms or assumptions� At 
this point, problems can arise inside an organization; barriers to organizational 
learning can emerge� “Individuals and organizations tend to deal with threat in 
ways that will increase defensiveness and reduce the probability of learning to 
learn�”16 Argyris and Schon contend that not all change has a positive effect on an 
organization� It can result in regression, stagnation, deception, and manipulation�
Institutional learning depends in part on the culture of an organization and 
the extent to which it facilitates an openness to both inquiry and new ideas�17 
Fighting organizations often have a unique culture that persists over a long 
period—and that can both impair learning and enhance it� The German army 
provides a good example of both impaired and enhanced learning� “[T]he mili-
tary culture that supported the Prusso-German approach to war had taken over a 
century to evolve� � � � German commanders had had to learn to devolve creative 
freedom and authority upon their juniors—an unprecedented and largely coun-
terintuitive step�”18
Argysis and Schon made a number of claims that differentiate double-loop 
learning from single-loop learning� First, it is relatively hard for an organization 
to create this kind of learning system; second, it cannot be evolved from single-
loop learning; finally, it is best suited to a complex environment in which there are 
many interacting variables� But when implemented successfully, it can have long-
term benefits� “Double-loop actions—the master programs—control the long-
range effectiveness, and hence, the ultimate destiny of the system�”19 The challenge 
that WATU faced certainly qualified as just such a complex environment�
THE QUADRANTS OF FIGHTING POWER: A MEANS OF ANALYSIS
Traditionally, fighting power has been interpreted using three elements: the 
moral, the physical, and the conceptual� A traditional instrument for facilitating 
navigation is the quadrant, which has a graduated ninety-degree arc� Fusing the 
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quadrant’s arc with the elements of fighting power provides a new, hybrid way to 
assess the effectiveness of WATU’s role in the improvement of ASW tactics� The 
quadrants used here with respect to the Battle of the Atlantic are four variables: 
new assumptions about tactics, changes in weapons technology and their subse-
quent application, developments in doctrine, and the adoption of an appropriate 
command philosophy� When all, or at least a majority of, these elements were 
present, WATU was facilitating a process of institutional learning�
The quadrants help illuminate two other issues� First, to what extent did senior 
officers, in a hierarchical organization, pursue their own agenda and succeed in 
shaping the manner in which the rest of their command interpreted experiential 
evidence? Second, to what degree do these quadrants help us understand the re-
lationship between the tactical battle and operational effectiveness in the North 
Atlantic and the fulfillment of Britain’s strategic objectives?
THE CONTEXT: GEOSTRATEGIC DEFICITS AND  
DISRUPTIVE TECHNOLOGY
The Royal Navy’s campaign in the North Atlantic was one of the most important 
it fought during the Second World War� This section is not intended to give a nar-
rative account of this campaign but to focus on particular aspects of the Battle of 
the Atlantic�20 What defined the campaign was the need to parry and defeat the 
disruptive technology of Germany’s U-boats�21 Three geostrategic deficits had 
emerged by July 1940, which compounded this challenge�
Sea Control and Sea Denial
The first deficit was the Royal Navy’s inability by July 1940 to enforce sea control 
and sea denial in the Western Approaches� This was a consequence of a decision 
made in the late 1930s� In April 1938, an agreement between the British and Irish 
governments brought to an end a long-standing trade and financial dispute that 
had been instigated by Eamon de Valera, the Irish prime minister� Part of that 
agreement, at the insistence of the British prime minster, Neville Chamberlain, 
was the relinquishment of what were called defended reserved ports� These had re-
mained under British control even after the secession of the south of Ireland from 
the United Kingdom in 1922�22 These naval ports were located in Lough Swilly in 
Donegal, Berehaven in Bantry Bay, and Haulbowline Island near Cork�23 Despite 
strategic arguments by Winston Churchill in the House of Commons against this 
decision, the handover date was set for December 31, 1938—eight months before 
the outbreak of the Second World War�24
With those ports unavailable, a set of geopolitical assumptions emerged that 
were not validated by subsequent events� Admiral Ernle Chatfield, RN, the First 
Sea Lord in 1938, stated in his autobiography that the loss of these ports in Eire 
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had no geostrategic consequences, an assertion that would be proved wrong by 
later events�25 The ability to enforce sea control and sea denial in the Western Ap-
proaches was contingent on the following: “With a French ally with an efficient 
navy, and a neutral, but friendly Norway, the Admiralty believed they could hold 
the position� Actually, their judgement in the envisaged circumstances proved 
right; the situation was held satisfactorily until the fall of Norway and the collapse 
of France�”26 But those losses did occur, and by June 1940 Britain found itself—
for the first time since the Williamite wars of 1689–97—without access to naval 
bases along the southwest coast of Ireland� Captain Stephen W� Roskill, RN, gave 
an incisive judgment about the consequences of this handover� “Had we enjoyed 
the use of the Eire bases, many Allied ships and seamen’s lives would have been 
saved, and perhaps the Atlantic battle won earlier�”27
During the First World War it was the introduction of convoys in 1917 that 
had defeated Germany’s antiaccess/area-denial strategy�28 These convoys were 
organized by a joint British and American command from Admiralty House 
in Queenstown near Cork—one of the ports that was no longer available in the 
Second World War�29
Convoy Routes
The second geostrategic deficit was another consequence of Chamberlain’s 1938 
decision� The Admiralty was forced to abandon—after the fall of France in June 
1940—the Western Approaches as a convoy route� Instead, all convoys for the rest 
of the war would go “north about Ireland�” The difficulty in sustaining this new 
convoy route was compounded by a lack of naval escorts and radar equipment 
(both air and seaborne) to cover this area�30
The German U-boat command appreciated what was happening and made its 
dispositions accordingly�31 The result was that between July and October 1940, 
a total of 282 ships were sunk off the northwest approaches of Ireland� This rep-
resented a total of 1,489,795 tons of merchant shipping� A German navy report 
described the effects of these vulnerabilities� “There were at times surprisingly 
high sinking figures in successive short operations near the North Channel� The 
U-boats pursued homeward-bound ships close in to the coast and attacked con-
voys whose escorts could not deal even with single U-boat attacks�”32
The operational issue was the absence of a basing structure to support the 
convoy route Britain had been forced to adopt� Londonderry came into use as a 
base starting in October 1940, but only for refueling� This operational deficit re-
mained unchanged until March 1941, when the Chief of Naval Operations of the 
U�S� Navy approved the construction, in secret, of two naval bases in Northern 
Ireland, one in Londonderry and a flying boat base on Lough Erne�33 Construc-
tion began in June 1941—six months before the U�S� entry into the war� These 
NWC_Autumn2019Review.indb   130 8/23/19   9:18 AM
 S L OA N  1 3 1
two bases became operational in February 1942� They created a new geostrategic 
context that increased both the accessibility and the mobility of the Allied navies�
An additional problem was the scarcity of naval escorts available for convoy 
duties and the operational range of those in service� In the critical months be-
tween July and October 1940, only one or two escorts accompanied each convoy� 
Furthermore, their range was limited to 200–50 miles west of Ireland, owing to 
the absence of naval facilities in neutral Eire� U-boats could operate to the west 
of the escorts’ operational range in the Atlantic� It was not until June 1941 that 
the Royal Navy initiated the use of end-to-end naval escorts for transatlantic 
convoys� By that date U-boats had sunk a total of 812 merchant ships�
U-boat Bases in Western France
The third geostrategic deficit was a consequence of the surrender of the French 
government in June 1940� Germany began to construct a string of new U-boat 
bases down the western seaboard of France, from Brest to Bordeaux� Out of the 
small force of fifty-seven German U-boats, forty-nine were operational, and the 
new bases provided a critical advantage, increasing the geographical scope of the 
boats’ operations�
The geostrategic significance of the absence of Allied bases in Eire became 
acute� As early as 1909 Sir Halford Mackinder had commented that Britain never 
“had to face enemies simultaneously eastward and southward,” except during 
the Napoleonic Wars�34 Now the relative accessibility of the Western Approaches 
from the western seaboard of France resulted in the reoccurrence of this scenario�
Other Challenges
In countering the disruptive technology of the submarine, the Royal Navy failed 
to remember a lesson of the First World War� “The British basically forgot that 
convoys alone had played the crucial role in blunting the U-boat offensive in 
1917�”35 It was access to southern Irish ports and bases that made the forma-
tion and routing of convoys effective� Second, the Royal Navy made a series of 
assumptions in the 1930s about the nature of the threat it would face and how 
it would counter that threat� Heavy reliance was placed on asdic (a submarine 
location device named after its progenitor, the Anti-Submarine Detection Inves-
tigation Committee), a primitive form of sonar that was believed widely to be a 
technological solution for any future threat�36
These assumptions were expressed by a representative of the First Lord of the 
Admiralty at the first meeting of the Shipping Defence Advisory Committee in 
March 1937, two and a half years before Britain entered the Second World War�37 
He stated that the United Kingdom faced three forms of attack: the airplane, 
the surface warship, and the submarine� Some claimed that the threat that the 
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submarine represented could be countered by technology alone� “[T]he subma-
rine menace � � � will never be, in my opinion and in the opinion of the navy, what 
it was before� We have means of countering a submarine which are very effective 
and which will normally reduce our losses from that weapon� It will never to my 
mind be a fatal menace that it was in the last war� We have taken effective steps 
to prevent that�”38
However, the combination of the operational limitations of asdic and the 
geostrategic deficits noted above presented the Admiralty with a toxic problem�39 
The Allies could contemplate projecting power onto the European continent and 
defeating the Third Reich only if there could be a buildup in Britain of men and 
matériel� This could be done only once the U-boat threat had been defeated so 
that convoys could carry the men and matériel safely to the United Kingdom� In 
addition, Britain needed to import a critical tonnage of food and materials if it 
were to continue to feed its population and sustain itself in the war� The North 
Atlantic was the vital theater for this movement of goods� The operational chal-
lenge was to ensure the safe and timely arrival of the convoys at British ports, 
especially prior to the entry of the United States into the war�
By the end of 1940, both sides recognized that the war could be won and lost in 
the North Atlantic� German admiral Karl Dönitz, head of the submarine arm of 
the Kriegsmarine, had calculated in 1942 that if Germany could inflict a monthly 
loss of seven hundred thousand tons of Allied shipping, Germany would win 
the war in Europe� This was an overestimate; more likely, six hundred thousand 
tons would have done the trick� The latter figure constitutes the Admiralty’s 
calculation of the minimum that had to be sustained if the Allied cause were to 
continue�40
In addition to the inadequacy of asdic and the loss of southern Irish naval 
bases, there were some additional institutional impediments� One of the most 
debilitating was the persistence, and indeed the resilience, of an inappropriate 
command philosophy, as described by Captain Donald Macintyre, RN� “The 
first few months were disappointing� Contact with the enemy was rare, mainly 
because of mistaken tactics employed by our command ashore� We were sent on 
one wild goose-chase after another to the positions of the latest sinkings, only 
to find—as expected—that the guilty U-boat had fled the scene and was hidden 
in the deepfield�”41 Pitted against them was a U-boat service whose ability to in-
novate was impressive� “Innovative tactics from August 1940 onward produced 
impressive results� Attacking on the surface and at night and in packs struck 
terror into the hearts of mariners and sank shipping as fast as the torpedo tubes 
could be reloaded�”42 The ability of the U-boats to apply this new doctrine and 
the Admiralty’s unwillingness to allow the on-scene RN commander to use his 
judgment produced a real handicap, as this excess of control was contrary to 
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a devolved command philosophy that went back to the Elizabethan navy� The 
development of shore-to-ship wireless communication at the beginning of the 
twentieth century eroded this command philosophy, and the reluctance of com-
mands ashore to devolve responsibility to commanders at sea persisted into 1941� 
Macintyre referred to a trip in February of that year: “Throughout the trip the 
escorts were subjected to all those interferences by the staff ashore about which 
we sea-captains had for so long felt bitter� The senior officer was unable to use 
his own judgement; the ships under his command were sent off on vain chases 
by orders from ashore�”43
CHALLENGING ASSUMPTIONS  
AND NEW ORGANIZATIONAL LEARNING
The fall of France and the heavy losses off the northwest coast of Ireland prompt-
ed some institutional changes in the Royal Navy� In February 1941, Western Ap-
proaches Command was moved from Plymouth to Liverpool, where a combined 
area headquarters was set up� It was to remain there for the rest of the war�
The change of location did not resolve the problems the Royal Navy faced with 
respect to ASW� This was reflected in Admiralty personnel appointments� The 
biographer of Captain Frederick Walker, RN, provides insight into this:
It seemed that by design or accident all the misfits of the navy had congregated at 
Liverpool� Among his brother officers were many of his own kind—“passed overs”—
who at some stage or other had become red-tape rebels� But the vast majority were 
officers of the Royal Naval Volunteer Reserve, week-end sailors churned out by the 
recruiting machine often with inadequate training� The Royal Naval Reserve, those 
independent merchant men who would become sore boils in big ship wardrooms, 
somehow fitted in here by providing their expert seamanship to balance the igno-
rance of the willing, but the lamentably “green,” RNVR�44
Given these disparate levels of experience, the need to disseminate and apply 
tactical doctrine consistently was vital� On the plus side, Western Approaches 
Command made a decision to form escort groups in February 1941, which would 
“work-up and train together and remain as self contained groups� The object was 
to protect convoys with efficient teams rather than with groups thrown haphaz-
ardly together�”45
The irony was that when the war started the Royal Navy had in place an autho-
rized doctrine for convoying�46 However, the doctrine assumed the main threat 
would come from German surface ships, and the use of the disruptive U-boat 
technology threw the Admiralty off balance�
[S]ixty-one percent of the ships sunk in convoy were the victims of night U-boat 
attack which came as a complete surprise to the British� But had the lessons of 
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World War One been studied, when the Germans had employed the same tactics, 
and indeed, had we read a book Donitz himself wrote between the wars in which he 
recounted his experiences of night attack on Allied convoys and advocated the use 
of these tactics in any future conflict, we might have been better prepared� He also 
publicly advocated the operation of U-Boats in wolf-packs and for which we were 
also unprepared�47
It also has been argued that Wilhelm Marschall pioneered this tactic and the Ger-
man navy developed it using torpedo boats during the 1920s, when the service 
was forbidden to have submarines under the Versailles settlement�48
These challenges were compounded by the fact that the Royal Navy had yet to 
address successfully the premier Clausewitzian question� What kind of conflict, 
at a tactical level, did it face in the Atlantic? “Professor Patrick Blackett, Direc-
tor of Naval Operational Research, highlighted the problem when he calculated 
some 60 percent of shipping losses could have been avoided, at least in part, if the 
less efficient groups had been raised to the standard of the more effective ones�”49
The creation of WATU in January 1942 meant that there now existed an in-
stitution that could collect, transfer, and integrate knowledge that would lead to 
three things: challenging existing norms, objectives, and policies that pertained 
to trade defense; facilitating adaptation and countering the tactics German U-
boats used to attack convoys; and teaching doctrine efficiently and disseminating 
it� The unit, which represented the Admiralty’s response to the shortcomings of 
trade defense in the North Atlantic, was located on the top floor of Derby House 
in Liverpool� It was set up in response to one of the recommendations of the 
Battle of the Atlantic Committee that Winston Churchill (British prime minister 
since May 1940) had set up to coordinate issues and address the problems that 
convoys and naval escorts faced� The officer appointed to command this new 
unit was Captain Gilbert Roberts, RN; the commander in chief of Western Ap-
proaches Command at this time was Admiral Sir Percy Noble� WATU’s initial 
aims were twofold: first, to end the incoherent tactics that had permeated trade 
defense since the start of the war; and second, to enable improvements in organi-
zational practices and norms to be devised and disseminated�
The importance of a systematic approach was articulated in 1915 by one of 
the most original thinkers in the U�S� Navy, Captain Dudley Knox� “The big 
questions of policy should first be settled as well as those of command, strategy, 
tactics, logistics, and matériel� Then from such basic decisions minor doctrines 
may be reasoned to flow logically and consistently�”50 WATU was pivotal to the 
learning process that would take place� It also attracted curiosity at the highest 
level: “Churchill was extremely anxious about the Atlantic situation� Many ques-
tions worried him: ‘Was the Asdic any good? Is the depth charge inefficient? 
What do the escorts do when their convoy is attacked?’”51
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Signals intelligence—or the lack of it—had an important impact on merchant 
shipping losses� “February 1942 saw a new variation of the Enigma system initi-
ated by the German navy for its U-boats that Bletchley Park was unable to deci-
pher for nearly eighteen months�52 The Allies were suddenly blinded to U-boat 
movements at the worst possible time� With the United States in the war, there 
were fresh targets for greatly reinforced U-boat wolf packs in the North Atlantic 
and off the coasts of South America and Africa� British and Allied losses in 1942 
were 56 percent higher than in 1941�”53 It is important to remember that U-boat 
control also was reading Allied signal traffic�
CHALLENGING NORMS, OBJECTIVES, AND POLICIES
The initial operational question that WATU addressed was as follows: How did 
the German U-boats operate tactically when attacking the convoys? The chal-
lenge for the British was to formulate, disseminate, and apply a tactical doctrine 
with an appropriate command philosophy that would lessen the losses of mer-
chant shipping and enable the defenders to destroy more U-boats�
Roberts’s First Attempt
Captain Roberts initially focused on collecting an experiential source of knowl-
edge� He made it his practice to talk to escort commanders as they came into 
Liverpool, Greenock, and Londonderry� There was one pivotal question: “When 
you are with a convoy at night and a ship is torpedoed, what do you do? They all 
talked about ‘going to action stations,’ ‘increasing speed,’ and so on but really the 
answer was nothing�”54
In addressing this problem, Roberts was aided by an important precedent 
that already existed within the Royal Navy: the prerogative of naval officers, 
from the rank of captain upward, to formulate and disseminate their own tacti-
cal doctrine—a practice Nelson had used successfully when preparing for the 
Battle of Trafalgar� Naval historians refer to his tactical doctrine as the Trafalgar 
Memorandum� Its historical antecedents go back to the seventeenth century� “In 
the Royal Navy, the existence of a formal doctrine can be traced back to the origi-
nal Fighting Instructions, first issued to the fleet over three hundred years ago in 
1672, and to a Code of Tactical Signals promulgated during the Commonwealth 
in 1653� Admirals Howe, Kempenfelt, and Popham subsequently improved tac-
tical doctrine with the issue of the Signal Book in 1799 and Popham’s Marine 
Vocabulary in 1800�”55
In the early years of the Battle of the Atlantic, escort group commanders put 
this tactical doctrine into practice� However, the quality of the doctrines and the 
extent of their dissemination were not consistent; there was a spectrum from the 
incomprehensible to the innovative�56 One of the best examples of the latter, prior 
to the inception of WATU, was that of Captain Frederick Walker, RN� While in 
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command of the 36th Escort Group beginning in October 1941, he disseminated 
the 36th Escort Group Operational Instructions to a total of nine ships in his 
group� These instructions demonstrated fluency among the operational objec-
tives, a tactical antisubmarine doctrine, and a command philosophy of devolved 
control� 
 1� The object of the Group while on escort duty is to ensure the safe and timely 
arrival of the convoy concerned� It is not possible, with the ships available, to dis-
pose of the Group in such a way as to protect the convoy completely from enemy 
attacks—these must be accepted and doubtless some losses� The only practicable 
course of action is to ensure that any enemy craft, either surface or air, which at-
tack are destroyed�
 2� The particular aim of the Group therefore is to be taken as the destruction of any 
enemy which attacks the convoy� U-boats are the chief menace to our convoys� I 
cannot emphasise too strongly that a U-boat sighted or otherwise detected is imme-
diately to be attacked continuously without further orders, with guns, depth charges, 
and/or ram until she has been destroyed or until further orders are received�
 3� I wish to impress on all officers that although I shall naturally take charge of 
the majority of operations, I consider it essential for themselves to act instantly 
without waiting for orders in situations of which I may be unaware or imperfectly 
informed�
 4� It should seldom, if ever, be necessary to conclude a signalled report with the 
words: “Request instructions�” Action should be “proposed” or “intended” by the 
men on the spot—and the senior officer can always say if he doesn’t like it�
 5� No officer will ever be blamed by me for getting on with the job in hand�57
Walker’s rendition of mission command orders and a statement of the com-
mander’s intent, while a classic, was not enough on its own to solve the problem 
of countering the tactical doctrine the U-boats were applying, in particular their 
proclivity to attack at night and on the surface� However, the process of insti-
tutional learning was helped by the willingness of escort group commanders, 
such as Walker, to share operational experience with Roberts’s new organization� 
In addition Walker devised a tactical response that coordinated the reaction of 
escorts to a U-boat contact: “On the order ‘Buttercup’ by radio, all escorts would 
turn outward, increase to full speed, fire star shell for twenty minutes, and then 
return to station� Walker had in fact sunk two U-Boats by this tactic whilst escort-
ing convoy HG 76 [home from Gibraltar]�”58
Changing Course
These contributions, while valuable, were still insufficient� The initial problem 
of the U-boats’ tactical operation was broken into two subquestions: From what 
range did the U-boats fire their torpedoes, and how did they approach a convoy? 
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Roberts challenged a key assumption escort commanders had been making: that 
the U-boats fired their torpedoes from outside the ring of naval escorts� In mak-
ing this challenge, he relied on two pieces of empirical data� First, the range of a 
German torpedo was 5,400 yards (3�6 miles)� Second, naval escorts operated up 
to five thousand yards (3�3 miles) out from a convoy�
Roberts made a new assumption that, to ensure a successful hit, the firing 
distance would be half the maximum range� This led to the second subquestion: 
If U-boats were attacking targets from within the convoy columns, how did they 
approach the convoy? There were four possibilities� (1) The U-boat dropped in 
from ahead on the surface, (2) it dived and surfaced in the middle of the convoy, 
(3) it pushed in from the convoy’s flanks, (4) it infiltrated a convoy from astern�
The last option was, as far as U-boat commanders were concerned, the safest 
approach, and Roberts concluded that it was the most likely� Submerged, a U-
boat could attain a speed of twelve knots, compared with a convoy speed of seven 
knots; thus the speed of infiltration from astern was five knots� Having success-
fully infiltrated from astern, the U-boat could fire its torpedoes on the surface 
from inside the convoy� This dovetailed with the operational experience of com-
manders such as Captain Walker� “The U-Boat was astern of the convoy, steer-
ing the same course, and the time was after midnight� Walker’s ‘stock’ turning 
outward after a torpedoing and firing star shell out had caught and killed another 
U-Boat, not the culprit of the attack but an infiltrator coming to join the fray�”59 
Walker’s “‘turn out’ doctrine” provided the departure point for new assumptions 
on the basis of which tactical doctrine would be constructed�
The process that yielded the correct answer to the question of the position 
from which the U-boats attacked represented a critical questioning of established 
norms; WATU had identified the fallacious nature of the existing assumptions� 
This demonstrated a willingness to question the beliefs of even experienced 
escort commanders such as Walker� “This [was] against all our ideas[;] Walker’s 
escorts imagined that the U-boat must be a mile or so outside the perimeter of 
the convoy ships�”60
Roberts’s staff consisted mostly of WRNS officers and ratings, who demon-
strated these new ideas on the recently constructed tactical floor to Admiral 
Noble�61 To his credit, Noble did not hesitate in communicating to the prime 
minister when doctrinal errors had been identified� “When Admiral Sir Percy 
Noble was briefed by Roberts on his analysis he frankly admitted the error of 
the existing anti-U-boat doctrine� He had a message sent to Churchill saying, 
‘the first investigations showed a cardinal error in anti-U-boat tactics, and that a 
new, immediate and corrected counter-attack would be signalled to the Fleet in 
24 hours�’”62
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WATU: Putting Doctrine into Practice
The next challenge was to facilitate adoption of the doctrine and counter the tac-
tics German U-boats used to attack convoys—infiltrating convoys from astern� 
The new knowledge was integrated into a doctrinal solution� “On a torpedoing 
within the convoy, on one word of command, the escorts, all except the one lead-
ing the convoy, would turn at full speed and line up abreast at the rear of the con-
voy, a couple of miles astern, and begin an Asdic sweep� The escorts’ speed would 
be reduced to that of the convoy and, like a giant ‘trawl’ behind a fishing vessel, 
‘sweep’ everything in front into the ‘trawl’ and they would have the U-boat�”63 
This tactical doctrine was called a “raspberry” and was the first of multiple “fruit” 
doctrines that WATU eventually formulated and disseminated�64
The new doctrine can be understood best through the prism of double-loop 
learning because it led to questioning the Royal Navy’s assumptions about how 
best to protect convoys from the disruptive technology of German submarines� 
Another way to understand the new doctrine is to see it as a manifestation of the 
quadrants of fighting power (new assumptions about tactics, changes in weapons 
technology and applications, developments in doctrine, and new command phi-
losophy), which were being integrated owing to WATU’s actions�
The Admiralty—a hierarchical and centrally controlled bureaucratic 
organization—now had, in WATU, an institution that could start to resolve the 
learning paradox and collect and integrate knowledge from diverse sources to 
formulate and disseminate a tactical doctrine that would be operationally ef-
fective� “The doctrine in the ‘Atlantic Convoy Instructions’ was synthesized by 
Roberts from reports of proceedings, direct feedback from escort group com-
manders, tactical games at WATU, and investigations by unit staff� The advantage 
over the ad hoc individualistic training provided by some group commanders 
was that WATU could both analyse and fuse the experiences and lessons of many 
convoy operations�”65
Atlantic Convoy Instructions, issued under the authority of the Admiralty, 
had two variants: North and South Atlantic� The resultant instructions formed 
the doctrinal riposte to the U-boat threat, and they brought operational direc-
tion together with tactical instruction� They began with general reminders� “The 
safe and timely arrival of the convoy at its destination is the primary object of the 
escort� Evasion attains the primary object and should therefore be the first course 
of action considered� At the same time, it must be borne in mind that if enemy 
forces are reported or encountered, the escort shares with all other fighting units 
the duty of destroying enemy ships�”66
This was fused with a devolved command philosophy� “The senior officer of 
the escort group is in the best position to judge the most suitable disposition 
for the escorts and the correct action to take in various circumstances�”67 The 
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application of the new doctrine was left to the discretion of senior commanders 
at sea� “Senior Officers of Escort Groups have complete freedom to exercise their 
initiative under all circumstances, and it is not desired that they should be rigidly 
bound to comply with any of the diagrams of operations orders laid down in ACIs 
[Atlantic Convoy Instructions]�”68
The doctrines that WATU formulated and disseminated were first applied in 
engagements against U-boats in 1942� Convoy SC104 provides a good illustration 
of the doctrines’ tactical impact� It sailed from New York on October 3, 1942, and 
was under attack from October 11 onward� Between 10:15 PM on October 13 and 
2:30 AM on October 14, six ships in this convoy were torpedoed� The response 
was in keeping with the tactical doctrine WATU had disseminated and was 
guided by the new, correct understanding of the direction of U-boat attack: “As 
all the escorts had now returned, operation ‘Raspberry’ was carried out, and at 
0318 HMS Fame obtained an asdic contact four miles astern of the Convoy� After 
an attack with a five charge pattern the U-boat surfaced and escaped downwind; 
Fame was unable to catch up due to the rough weather�”69
The naval escorts of SC104 continued to be successful in applying this tactical 
doctrine in subsequent attacks� “At 1407/16 Fame, about two miles ahead of the 
fourth column, scored a notable asdic success, her first pattern, fired on a con-
tact obtained at 2,000 yds, brought the U-Boat to the surface� Fame opened fire 
and went into ram� U353 was struck a glancing blow and a further pattern was 
dropped when it was abreast the stern� The crew hastily abandoned ship and the 
U-Boat then sank�”70 This report needs to be seen in the context of 120 merchant 
ship sinkings during that month, and a total of 1,322 for the year� However, this 
month saw the beginning of a downward trend: by December, losses had fallen 
to seventy-six; by October 1943, thirty-one�71
WATU also disseminated a tactical doctrine detailing how a naval escort 
should respond on sighting a torpedo track�
 1� RUN UP TRACK, sweeping by ASDIC�
 2� Hoist warning signal� At night if “Snowflake” illumination by the convoy will assist 
the sighting ship to locate the U-Boat without endangering the convoy, fire two 
white rockets�
 3� REPORT BY R/T [radio transmitter] to escorts and aircraft�
 4� Allow adjacent ships to catch up so as to increase the efficiency of the asdic sweep�72
These doctrines constituted part of what was referred to as Western Ap-
proaches Tactical Policy� They encapsulated correct assumptions about U-boat 
tactics, the application of weapons technology, new doctrines, and the adoption 
of an appropriate command philosophy—the four quadrants of fighting power� It 
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had taken the Admiralty two years and four months since the start of the war to 
establish WATU, but now the unit was an integral part of the command structure, 
and yet was showing itself to be decentralized enough to respond quickly to the 
changing characteristics of the campaign in the North Atlantic�
The Instructions provided a common doctrine, so that escorts could be told what to 
do in a given situation quickly and concisely� Roberts did not try to impose a doctri-
naire approach on tactics� On the contrary, captains and escort group commanders 
were encouraged to experiment with their own tactical schemes� Hence while there 
were standard instructions, their application remained elastic� Roberts insisted that 
group commanders show initiative and, at all times, display tactical aggression�73
WATU endeavored to ensure that the Atlantic Convoy Instructions never 
became a rigid template applied irrespective of changes in the character of the 
campaign� The instructions were improved and updated continually� There also 
was a recognition that maintaining operational tempo meant managing informa-
tion efficiently, including disseminating new tactics quickly� As a practical matter, 
in a predigital age, this meant that “Howard-Johnston [ASW staff officer in Derby 
House] was dispatched to the printers so that there would be no delay in applying 
the new tactics to the Western Approaches Convoy Instructions!”74
Teaching the Doctrine
As seen through the prism of double-loop learning, one of the most important 
functions WATU performed was applying its decentralized structure to the 
teaching of these new norms, policies, and objectives, once Roberts’s staff had 
developed them� Systematic dissemination of doctrine was best ensured by teach-
ing it� Between 1942 and 1945, WATU took doctrine back to its etymological 
roots�75 The course was not intended to ensure that a number of tasks could be 
performed on a repetitive basis; instead, the teaching was nuanced, and doctrine 
was interpreted as being authoritative but requiring judgment in its application� 
The integrated knowledge that WATU had accumulated enhanced operational 
effectiveness� The instruction also was interservice, in terms of its cohort: per-
sonnel from not only the Royal Navy but the Coastal Command of the Royal Air 
Force attended courses run at WATU�76 The aim was to ensure that this tactical 
doctrine facilitated application of one of the most important principles of war: 
unity of effort�
This raises three questions that need to be addressed to understand and ap-
preciate the effectiveness of this institutional learning: What was the content of 
these courses? How were they managed? And who attended them? The content 
of the courses consisted of four distinct modules�77 Its four modules covered a 
diverse set of topics in a short period, while ensuring that a singular objective 
was met and each course lasted one week� Roberts’s annual report of December 
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1944 provides an insight to the number of courses that had been conducted up 
to that date and how his staff managed the teaching challenge at WATU� “A total 
of 132 courses have passed through W�A�T�U� in line ahead at one day interval 
between each� If, during three years work, standard game and lecture routine 
had been adopted, the Staff would long ago have become tired and stale� � � � 
[I]t is of paramount importance to show the course officers that the Staff is always 
enthusiastic, in order to transmit enthusiasm and zest�”78
The numbers and ranks of the officers who attended the course reflected both 
hierarchical structure and operational need� RN attendees’ ranks ranged from 
admiral (one student) to warrant officer (six students); the most numerous rank 
was lieutenant (479 students)� Roberts ensured that WATU’s ASW tactical doc-
trine was disseminated widely throughout the officer corps of the Royal Navy, 
writ large� “No Admiralty appointment has ever been denied to even an R�N�V�R� 
Sub-Lieutenant from doing the full U-boat course�”79 Apart from officers from 
the naval reserves and Commonwealth navies, there also were officers from six 
foreign navies�80 As noted, WATU was part of a joint command, and 118 RAF 
personnel attended the one-week course� These attendees’ ranks ranged from air 
commodore (two students) to flight sergeant (five students)� Four civilian profes-
sors also attended�81 In all, between early 1942 and late 1944, 3,585 officers at-
tended courses run by WATU� “The peak of this period was reached in early 1944 
when each weekly course contained an average of 40 officers� The average at the 
end of 1944 had dropped to just 30, which average is maintained by requirements, 
space, and staff available� This averages 1,500 officers per annum�”82
Doctrinal Integration
By early 1943, WATU again had proved responsive and adaptive by integrating 
the new technology of the escort carrier into ASW doctrine� Although each carri-
er could operate only six or seven aircraft, it could maintain a continuous combat 
air patrol over a convoy and directly addressed what had become known as the 
“air gap�” This was an area in the middle of the Atlantic that could not be covered 
by shore-based Allied patrol aircraft� The escort carrier did much to comple-
ment the very-long-range B-24 Liberators based in Northern Ireland, Iceland, 
and Halifax� On February 11, 1943, Commander in Chief, Western Approaches 
sent a memorandum classified “Most Secret” to the secretary of the Admiralty� It 
confirmed that the process of integration had been completed successfully� “After 
experience had been gained in the operation of Escort Carriers, a new Article 
145 will be incorporated in A�C�I�s�”83 The new Instructions for the Operation of 
Escort Carriers, issued on February 7, 1943, took care to settle the issue of com-
mand within the existing command philosophy framework� “Command at sea is 
to be exercised in accordance with A�C�I� Article 16� With reference to paragraph 
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3 of Article 16, an Escort Carrier is NOT to be considered as forming part of the 
A/S Escort�”84 Thus, a new weapon was integrated doctrinally without compro-
mising the existing command arrangements, as the commanding officer of an 
escort carrier could not command other escort ships�
WATU replicated its activities within the North Atlantic theater and beyond it� 
By the end of 1942, a second tactical unit was operating in Londonderry� When 
Roberts submitted his annual report for the end of 1944, three more tactical units 
had been established in Belfast, Northern Ireland, and in Irwell and Osprey in 
Scotland� Tactical units also had been established in Bombay, Sierra Leone, and 
Halifax� Roberts summed up the relationship between WATU and these outsta-
tions as follows: “Tactical Units have been installed in the Empire which are not 
under my charge, but are ‘in touch�’”85 This further illustrates that WATU enabled 
the Royal Navy to replicate a learning organization that successfully could chal-
lenge existing norms, objectives, and policies pertaining to trade defense even 
when applied to geographically diverse theaters of operation�
The preparation for the D-day landings in Normandy provides another 
good example of WATU undertaking new doctrinal tasks� From mid-March 
to mid-May 1944, a number of special courses were held concurrently with the 
existing courses; the Admiralty appointed extra staff members to cope with the 
situation� “These special courses were in anti-E-boat (and anti-W-boat) warfare, 
and a total of 372 officers took part in the preparations for OVERLORD� During 
this period there was close liaison between W�A�T�U� and the port operational 
authorities concerned�”86 The value of this adaptive flexibility was recognized in 
a memo from the Commander in Chief, Western Approaches to the secretary of 
the Admiralty dated December 20, 1944� “The special tactical training given for 
Operation OVERLORD is deserving of the highest praise�”87
As emphasized previously, the operational objective of the naval escorts was 
to ensure the safe and timely arrival of the convoys� Tactically, the most effective 
way to achieve this was to avoid the U-boat wolf packs completely� This could 
be achieved by rerouting convoys past the enemy’s patrol lines� By August 1942, 
WATU had formulated and disseminated an additional tactical doctrine� This 
underlines the point that enemy practice often leads to the formulation of new 
doctrine� In this case, the objective was to enable naval escorts to react effectively 
to a shadowing U-boat, yet still enable a convoy to execute an alteration of course 
and thereby avoid an attack�
U-boats will sometimes remain shadowing for several days[,] reporting from time to 
time on H/F� If other U-boats are ordered to close the convoy to make a “Pack” attack 
the shadowing U-boat will, in the later stages, before attack, make signals on M/F� On 
receipt of a bearing of an M/F homing signal it should always be assumed that the 
convoy is concerned and an immediate search should be along the bearing obtained� 
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Should a U-boat be sighted, an escort should be left in the area to keep it down until 
dark, even if asdic contact is not gained, so as to cover a large alteration of course by 
the convoy�88
By early 1943, rerouting tactics had reached their limits� “Dönitz’s strategy, 
driven by the amount of tonnage sunk per U-boat day at sea, had forced him to 
concentrate his effort in the mid-ocean air gap so that by early 1943 it was literally 
filling up with submarines�”89 This area presented the increasingly large and nu-
merous wolf packs with many opportunities� Again, such a change on the enemy’s 
part required that the defenders adjust; in this case, they needed to engage and 
sink U-boats in and around the convoy, as stated in the ACIs: “[T]he close escort 
of a convoy was the last line of defence, and it fought if all else failed�”90
Yet by May 1943, Germany’s wolf-pack doctrine was facing severe challenge� 
During this month there were a series of battles around convoys� Naval escorts 
inflicted losses that were not sustainable� By late 1943, German staff records 
reveal the multifaceted challenges that new weapons technology and doctrine 
were presenting� “The U-boats had been seriously impeded by air and sea escorts 
of unprecedented strength and, in the nocturnal melee, had failed to gain bear-
ing through having to take avoiding action against air and surface radar, diving 
because of the approach of aircraft or destroyers, fighting off aircraft�”91 The 
teaching at WATU had enabled the dissemination and application of an effective 
ASW tactical doctrine that included the use of weapons technology that forced a 
suboptimal German response�
WATU had no equal in the German navy� After the German surrender in May 
1945, Captain Roberts had the opportunity to interrogate Rear Admiral Godt, 
operational commander of the U-boat arm� Roberts recounted,
I could not resist asking Godt if there was any form of Tactical Table [the exercise 
floor at Western Approaches Command, located in Derby House, Liverpool], similar 
to W�A�T�U� in his service� He replied that there was not, but in 1944 he had seen 
the “Illustrated” and had caused the article and the photographs of W�A�T�U� to be 
commented upon by his Staff� He admitted the value of such an Establishment, but 
he did not consider adapting it to his needs as it was firstly “too late in the war” and 
secondly he relied more on the sea training with the Tactical Flotilla�92
The article set out to discover the impact of organizational learning and the entity 
that implemented it during World War II� First, can a theory of organizational 
learning explain the improved effectiveness of one tactical organization during 
the Second World War—specifically, the development of antisubmarine tactical 
doctrine between 1942 and 1945—and illustrate the importance of acquiring new 
knowledge in an operational context like the Battle of the Atlantic? Second, to 
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what extent was WATU the product of a bureaucratic, centrally controlled, hier-
archical Admiralty and how was it able to collect, transfer, and integrate knowl-
edge to achieve three things: first, challenge existing norms, objectives, and poli-
cies that pertained to trade defense; second, facilitate adaptation of tactics and 
counter the tactics German U-boats used to attack convoys; and third, teach and 
disseminate doctrine to naval officers appointed to escorts in the North Atlantic 
and officers from the RAF’s Coastal Command? Finally, was the learning para-
dox—the ability to imbue a naval hierarchy with adaptability and flexibility—re-
solved, and does WATU represent only a concrete, historically specific case, or 
are there lessons worth learning for other navies in the twenty-first century?
Double-loop learning provides a framework to understand how WATU cre-
ated a learning climate that successfully challenged the assumptions about how 
naval escorts should react when a convoy was attacked� New norms, objectives, 
and policies were developed� Most importantly, it spurred pursuit of an answer to 
the critical tactical problem: How and from what range did the U-boats attack a 
convoy? Learning the correct answer to this problem brought about a complete re-
writing of the Royal Navy’s ASW tactical doctrine—in particular, what the escorts 
should do when a U-boat attack began� By late 1942 and early 1943, new weapons 
systems embedded in a tactical doctrine framework meant that the Admiralty 
could both protect convoys from U-boat attacks and at the same time turn the 
area around the convoys into a killing ground� The learning paradox was resolved�
In this process, the four quadrants of fighting power can be discerned: the 
correction of assumptions about how the conflict was being fought, changes 
in weapons technology, development of new doctrine, and adoption of an ap-
propriate command philosophy� All four helped WATU to enhance its tactical 
and operational effectiveness� The Royal Navy, thanks in part to the inception 
of WATU, overcame one of the most important challenges that any organization 
faces in a crisis: the proclivity to produce a dysfunctional response to sustained 
threats and problems� “Individuals and organizations tend to deal with threat in 
ways that will increase defensiveness and reduce the probability of learning to 
learn�”93 The German report previously cited reveals the Royal Navy’s initial ap-
proach to the ASW challenge near the North Channel in late 1940 to have been 
just such a dysfunctional response�
Pivotal to the Allied victory in the Battle of the Atlantic was the neutraliza-
tion of the disruptive U-boat technology� This was achieved in part through the 
embedding of new and improved weapons systems, ranging from 10 cm radar 
to escort carriers, into a doctrinal framework� The effectiveness of these new 
“hard” weapons technologies was enhanced by a synthesis of the “soft” weapons 
of signals intelligence and doctrine� The integration of these diverse elements 
produced a force-multiplier effect that from late 1942 increased the tempo and 
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effectiveness of ASW tactical operations and enabled defeat of the U-boats at the 
operational level in the North Atlantic theater�
Finally, what lessons can twenty-first-century navies learn from the case study 
presented here? First, this historically specific case shows that a well-formulated, 
disseminated, and consistently applied doctrine can be a force multiplier�
Second, the strategic importance of certain geographical locations are not 
permanently discounted by changes in transport or weapons technology� Fur-
thermore, human agency has its limitations� The disruptive technology of the 
submarine meant that the Irish naval bases that covered the Western Approaches 
were just as important for the formation and routing of convoys in the Second 
World War as they had been in the First World War—the caveat being that in the 
former war the Royal Navy did not have access to them because of the geostrate-
gic blindness of British policy makers in the late 1930s�
Finally, poor geostrategic decision-making can be redeemed by alternative 
choices that offset the loss of operational efficiency and effect� In March 1941, 
although their country was still technically neutral and referring to itself as an 
associated power, U�S� military planners with presidential endorsement made 
the decision, in secret, to begin the construction of two naval bases in Northern 
Ireland� This was done on the basis of the recognition that the threat to sea com-
munications of the United Kingdom was a key risk that had to be addressed by the 
United States and the geostrategic center of gravity was the northwest approaches�
Navies of the twenty-first century can take away a number of other pertinent 
lessons� For a navy to learn there has to be an institutional appreciation that a 
discrepancy exists between an action taken and the result—in short, there are 
often unexpected consequences� Inquiry and reflection should result in correc-
tive action, which then should become “embedded in organizational memory 
� � � and in organizational routines and procedures�”94 A doctrine that simply 
encapsulates required routines and procedures is not enough; the command 
philosophy has to meet the circumstances as well� General Sir Rupert Smith has 
identified the dynamic relationship between doctrine and command philosophy� 
“If doctrine is the epoxy the commander’s way of command in the circumstances 
is the hardener�”95 The success of this combination will depend on a receptive 
attitude within an officer corps and how such receptiveness can be engendered� 
Furthermore, there is still a need for navies to teach doctrine� The learning out-
come can be a force multiplier that can give a competitive edge when forces are 
evenly matched or outnumbered�
This learning outcome is illustrated by one of the critical stages of the Battle of 
the Atlantic: “Through January and February [1943] Ultra provided the informa-
tion, but the Germans were reading the Allies’ daily estimates of U-boat positions 
and anticipated their movements� The battle for ONS 166 in late February, in 
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which 14 ships were lost in a six-day battle with 18 U-boats, was fought with both 
shore staffs reading the other side’s signal traffic�”96 A theory of organizational 
learning helps to explain how the Royal Navy, through the teaching of doctrine, 
improved tactical effectiveness of its naval escorts� The institution created to 
formulate and disseminate doctrine, WATU, proved adept at challenging existing 
norms, objectives, and policies� This example underscores the claim made about 
doctrine by Julian Corbett; it is “the soul of warfare�”97
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